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Abstract
This paper studies regional labour markets in a country with cen-
tralised wage bargaining. We use a four-stage theoretical model with
two regions and one sector. In the ﬁrst stage the union and the em-
ployer federation engage in Nash bargaining at the national level ac-
cording to a Right To Manage (RTM) model. In the second stage the
individual employers determine the number of employees they want
to hire given the outcome of the national wage bargaining. In the
third stage individuals decide whether or not they want to migrate
to another region and whether they want to participate in the labour
market or not. In the fourth stage the product market clears. In this
model, depending on the parameters, the level of migration and the
change in participation determine the distribution of unemployment
over the regions.
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11 Introduction
In a large part of Continental Europe wage bargaining is highly centralised.
Sectoral wages are determined at the national level instead of at the com-
pany or regional level. In Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden wage bargaining pre-
dominantly takes place at either the sectoral or national level (see OECD,
2004, Table 3.5; and European Commission 2003, Table 27). Moreover,
the sectoral wages as negotiated by the union and the employer federation
at the national level apply to a large part of the people working in that
sector. Although union density decreased over the past decades, collective
bargaining coverage remains high (OECD, 2004). Where bargaining coverage
represents the real extent to which salaried workers are subject to the union-
negotiated wages and other conditions of employment. Partly due to legal
and administrative extensions of agreements, bargaining coverage in most
of the abovementioned countries in 2000 varies between 79 and 96 percent.
Exceptions are Ireland (66 percent) and Portugal (70 percent)1.A sar e s u l t
sectoral wages do not vary as much across regions as they would have if they
were to reﬂect regional labour market conditions. Wages do diﬀer due to
skill, ﬁrm size and sectoral diﬀerences, but less so due to diﬀerences in local
labour market conditions (European Commission, 2003, p. 115). Both the
European Commission (2003) and the OECD (1994, 2004 ) advocate decen-
tralisation of wage bargaining so that wages can adjust more easily to local
labour market conditions. However, the wage bargaining structure is deeply
embedded in the economic and social fabric of a country and countries are
therefore reluctant to follow these recommendations. As a consequence wage
bargaining is still highly centralised in large parts of Continental Europe.
1European Commission (2003, Table 27). According to OECD (2004, Table 3.5), how-
ever, coverage in Portugal exceeds 80 percent.
2Other reasons for the slow implementation of reforms to decentralise wage
bargaining are concerns for equity and social cohesion and doubts concerning
the eﬃcacy of these reforms for increasing employment (OECD, 2004).
We want to model regional labour markets with centralised wage bargain-
ing, because of the prevalence of centralised wage bargaining and the high
bargaining coverage in a large part of Continental Europe. The inﬂuence
of wage-setting institutions on aggregate labour market performance has al-
ready been given a lot of attention in the literature.2 The inﬂuence of regional
unemployment on regional wages (the wage curve) is equally well researched.
One of the possible theoretical explanations behind this empirical relation-
ship involves wage bargaining at the local level (see the seminal book by
Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994).
The inﬂuence of wage-setting institutions on regional labour markets on the
other hand is less well researched. Theoretical articles combining wage bar-
gaining and regional labour markets are scarce. The only article that we are
aware of is by Faini (1999). Faini (1999) models the inﬂuence of regional
trade unions on regional development in a two-region dual economy. By con-
trast, we model regional labour markets under centralised wage bargaining.
Our framework allows one to study e.g. the inﬂuence of demand shocks,
changes in bargaining power, and unemployment beneﬁts on regional labour
markets under centralised wage bargaining.
The theoretical framework consists of a four-stage model with two regions and
one sector. In the ﬁrst stage wages are determined by wage bargaining at the
national level. The union and employer federation engage in Nash bargaining
according to a Right To Manage (RTM) model. In the second stage individual
employers maximise proﬁts by choosing the optimal number of employees
they want to hire given the outcome of the national wage bargaining. In
2Surveys of this literature are provided by, for example, Blau and Kahn (1999) and
Nickell and Layard (1999).
3the third stage individuals maximise their utility by deciding whether or not
they want to migrate to another region and whether they want to participate
i nt h el a b o u rm a r k e to rn o t .I nt h ef o u r t hs t a g et h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tc l e a r s .
In this model, depending on the parameters, the change in participation and
the level of migration determine the distribution of unemployment over the
regions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we will develop
the model in section 2. Next, the model is solved in section 3. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
The union and the employer federation engage in Nash bargaining at the na-
tional level according to a Right To Manage (RTM) wage bargaining model.
The union and the employer federation negotiate on the wage rate and the
individual employers determine how many employees they want to hire.
The basic model has one sector and two regions (r =1 ,2 ) .E a c hr e g i o nh a s
regional characteristics (cr). W o r k i n g - a g ep e o p l e( j =1 ,···,J) are either
employed (E), unemployed (U), or inactive (I). People are identical in their
characteristics and preferences. The aim is to model the behaviour of jobless
people, with special attention to the behaviour of the jobless people in the
region with the poorest labour market conditions i.e. the outﬂow region
(region 1). Jobless individuals can either search for a job, or become inactive.
A jobless person can either look for work in his own region, or in the other
region. Due to the costs of moving etc. jobless workers only look for work
outside their region if labour market conditions are more favourable in the
other region3. A jobless individual can decide to search for a job in the other
3Leaving aside e.g. dramatical changes in regional characteristics.
4region, but he waits for a job oﬀer before he migrates. We concentrate on
the situation in which employment rises, because we want to study both
migration and participation behaviour.
The production, is determined by both supply and demand factors. Regional
trade does occur, but transport costs are assumed to be zero. Each ﬁrm
produces the same amount of goods and uses the same amount of labour and
capital.
In the model four stages are distinguished. First, the employer federation
and the union negotiate on the wage rate. Next, the ﬁrms decide how many
employees they need and announce the number of people they want to hire
or lay-oﬀ. Then, the unemployed workers choose whether or not they want
to stay active in the labour market and whether or not they want to migrate
to another region if they ﬁnd a job in the other region. Finally, ﬁrms produce
goods and consumers buy the goods. The price of the good is determined
and the goods market clears.
2.1 Stage 1: Nash bargaining
The union and the employer federation engage in Nash bargaining at the na-
tional level according to a Right To Manage (RTM) wage bargaining model.
The union is assumed to maximise the sum of all people’s income. For
t h ec a s eo fi n a c t i v ep e o p l et h eﬁnancial equivalent of their leisure which they
incur because they do not search is taken as income. So, the union’s objective
is to maximise: V = E∗ (W)W +( J − E∗(W) − I)b + IbI,w h e r eE∗ is the
number of employed people, W is wages and b are unemployment beneﬁts.
I is the number of inactive people (note that I is endogenously determined
in our model), and bI is their ‘income’. Further we assume that to the union
it does not matter whether you are unemployed or inactive, that is b = bI
in this expression, so V = E∗(W)W +( J − E∗(W))b.W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
5value of the union’s outside option if bargaining breaks down is given by
A = Jb. This can be interpreted as non-union wages: each individual should
now bargain with a ﬁrm himself, and has (practically) no bargaining power.
This would result in a non-union wage equal to b, so total income would
equal Jb. Alternatively, we could interpret this as all individuals receiving a
beneﬁt b.
The employer federation maximises the sum of all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, ¯ Π =
 N
n=1Πn.
The employer federation’s outside option is 0. Bargaining power is given by
β for the union and 1 − β for the employer federation, with 0 < β < 1.
2 . 2 S t a g e2 :H i r ed e c i s i o n
Each employer (n =1 ,···,N) determines the number of employees he wants
to hire (En) in order to maximise proﬁts. We assume that after migration
there will be no unﬁlled vacancies.
2.3 Stage 3: Migration/participation decision
I fe m p l o y m e n tr i s e si nb o t hr e g i o n sa n dp e o p l ed on o tq u i t ,p r e v i o u s l ye m -
ployed people stay employed. The jobless workers choose whether or not
t h e yw a n tt os t a ya c t i v ei nt h el a b o u rm a r k e ta n dw h e t h e ro rn o tt h e yw a n t
to migrate to another region if they ﬁnd a job in the other region. Actual
migration only occurs after ﬁnding a job in the other region.
The distribution of previously employed people over regions is the same as
the current distribution of ﬁrms over regions. This reﬂects the fact that ﬁrms
(n =1 ,···,N) are identical, and the implicit assumption that the number
of ﬁrms (or at least the distribution) has not changed. Note that relaxing
this assumption implies that people may migrate because one region now
has more ﬁrms and therefore more jobs. In our model, we abstract from this
6eﬀect. Instead, we focus on a general rise in employment and analyse the
resulting migration and participation decision.
The migration and participation decision depend on labour market conditions
i.e. the probability (ρr) of obtaining a job in region r , regional characteristics
(cr), wages (W), unemployment beneﬁts (b), beneﬁts of staying at home and
n o th a v i n gt os e a r c hf o raj o b( H), and the costs of moving (F).
2.4 Stage 4: Production/consumption




with Yn output of ﬁrm n, En employment at ﬁrm n,a n dϕ and α parameters
with ϕ > 0a n d0< α < 1. Note that this is a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion where capital is independent of n and taken as given (and incorporated





with Yn the quantity demanded, Pn the price, θ > 0 a parameter, and ε the
price elasticity of demand for the ﬁrm’s product which is treated as constant
and exogenous (see Layard et al., 1991, Chapter 2; see also Lee and Pesaran,
1993). Note that ε is the ﬁrm speciﬁc elasticity of demand, not the elasticity
of aggregate demand εad, and we have ε = εad in case of monopoly or full
collusion, ε = Nεad for the symmetric Cournot case, and ε = ∞ with perfect
competition. Thus, ε increases if aggregate demand is more elastic and if
ﬁrms behave more competitively. We assume that ε > 1.
Demand and supply determine the product’s price and the quantity de-
manded. The product market clears immediately.
73 S o l u t i o no ft h em o d e l
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium of the model. The
solution of the model is split into two parts. First, stages 4, 2 and 1 are
solved in section 3.1. Next stage 3 is solved in section 3.2.
3.1 Wages and employment
Since we assume for simplicity that parameters are such that in each region
suﬃcient workers will be available to ﬁll all vacancies (either living there,
or coming from the other region), we can for now skip the solution of the
third stage of our model. Even without solving this stage explicitly, we are
able to solve for equilibrium price (t = 4), equilibrium employment (t =2 ) ,
and equilibrium wage (t = 1). The solution of the third stage describes
equilibrium migration and participation. This is discussed in detail in section
3.2.
First consider t = 4. In this stage, the market is cleared and the equilibrium











( W eu s et h es u p e r s c r i p t∗ to denote equilibrium values of the variables.)
At t =2 ,e a c hﬁrm maximises its proﬁts Πn by selecting En, the total

































8The second-order condition (SOC) requires ε > 1( w h i c hw ea s s u m e dt o
hold). Imposing symmetry, we now conclude that total (national) employ-
ment is E∗ = NE∗
n and total regional employment is E∗
r = NrE∗
n,f o rr =1 ,2.
The Nash bargaining between the union and the employer federation at t =1
results in a wage W which satisﬁes (since A = Jb)
max
W
(E∗ (W)(W − b))
β
 
¯ Π(W) −   A
 1−β
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w h e r ew eu s eδ to refer to the term between brackets, which is a function of
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b.
Note that W ∗ depends only on the parameters α, β, ε, and the unemployment
beneﬁt b. (It can be veriﬁed that W ∗ >b .) Substituting W ∗ into the
expression for E∗, we see that employment depends on these parameters,
as well as on N, θ,a n dϕ.
3.2 Migration and participation
Now we turn to the equilibrium of the third stage of the model, in which
working-age people decide in which region to search for a job, or to become
inactive. Since all ﬁrms are ex ante identical and all individuals have the same
utility function, the probability of an individual ﬁnding a job in a region is
given by the number of jobs in that region net of previously employed, divided
by the number of people searching for a job in this region. Abstracting from
any migration and assuming that none of the Jr individuals becomes inactive,








r represents the number of employed people in region r in the pre-
vious period (t = 0). Of course, if people migrate or become inactive, this
probability changes.
It will be convenient in the following to denote by γr the fraction of previously
jobless people in region r who will not search for a job in their own region
r (either because they become inactive, or because they will search in the
other region s  = r). We use γr,M to denote the fraction of previously jobless
people in region r that has decided to search for a job in the other region
(and migrates if and only if they ﬁnd a job indeed), and γr,I to denote the
fraction of previously jobless people in region r that has decided to become
inactive, so γr = γr,M +γr,I. Note that our assumptions imply that migration
occurs only in one direction, so if migration occurs in equilibrium, we can
characterise one region as the ‘outﬂow’ region and the other as the ‘inﬂow’
region. Without loss of generality, we assume that if migration occurs, region
1i st h eo u t ﬂow region and region 2 is the inﬂow region, so γ2,M =0 .T a k i n g
into account migration and participation, the probabilities (ρ)o fﬁnding a















2)+γ1,M (J1 − E0
1)
(2)
(provided, of course, that these expressions are in between 0 and 1).
The individuals take decisions in turn, maximizing their expected utility. A
jobless individual j currently living in region r has three options:
1. stay in his own region r and try to ﬁnd a job there;
2. try to ﬁnd a job in the other region s, and move there if and only if he
has success;
113. stay in his own region r and become inactive.
(Formally, there will be a fourth possibility, which is to move to the other
region and be inactive there. This possibility is ruled out by our assumption
that regions are suﬃciently similar and/or moving cost F is suﬃciently high.)
Expected utility in the ﬁrst case is given by
EUjr|stay = ρrUjr(W
∗,c r,0) + (1 − ρr)Ujr(b,cr,0), (3)
in the second case by
EUjr|move = ρsUjr(W∗ − F,cs,0) + (1 − ρs)Ujr (b,cr,0), (4)
a n di nt h et h i r dc a s eb y
EUjr|inactive = Ujr (0,c r,H). (5)
Ujr(W ∗,c r,0) represents the utility of an employed person receiving wage
W∗. Note that in case of employment in the other region moving cost F
are subtracted from W ∗. The utility of a unemployed person receiving ben-
eﬁts b is equal to Ujr(b,cr,0). The utility of an inactive person is equal to
Ujr(0,c r,H), where H are the beneﬁt so fs t a y i n ga th o m ea n dn o th a v i n g
to search for a job. Note that u (W∗) > 0, u  (W ∗) < 0, u (b) > 0, u  (b) < 0,
u (H) > 0, and u  (H) < 0.
Depending on the values of the parameters, we may have four diﬀerent cases
for individuals in the outﬂow region 1, and two diﬀerent cases for individuals
in the inﬂow region 2. A graphic presentation of the four diﬀerent cases
of the migration/participation decision of a jobless individual in region 1 is
depicted in ﬁgure 1. Since previously jobless individuals from region 1 take
their migration/participation decision one after the other, the probability of
obtaining a job in their own region (ρ1), or in the other region (ρ2) depends
on the decision of all the individuals before them. Consequently the expected
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Expected utility of a jobless individual living in region 1.
13utility of looking for a job in the own region (equation 3), looking for a job in
the other region (equation 4) and becoming inactive (equation 5) depends on
the decisions of the individuals before them, as is shown in ﬁgure 1. Where
γ on the horizontal axis depicts the number of people who plan to drop out
of the labour market of region 1, either because they want to look for a job
in the other region, or because they want to become inactive. Let us start
with the situation in which some previously jobless people in region 1 decide
to search for a job in the other region (region 2) and others decide to become
inactive, see part (I) of ﬁgure 1. The ﬁrst individual in region 1 who makes a
migration/participation decision has an expected utility E(U2)i fh ec h o o s e s
to search for a job in region 2, an expected utility E(U1)i fh ec h oo s e st os e a r c h
for a job in his own region and an expected utility E(Uin)i fh ec h o o s e st o
become inactive in his own region. Since E(U2) >E (Uin) >E (U1)t h eﬁrst
individual drops out of the labour market in region 1 and searches for a job
in region 2. The number of people looking for a job has decreased by one in
region 1 and has increased by one in region 2. This decreases the probability
of obtaining a job and thereby expected utility of searching for a job in region
2 and increases the probability of obtaining a job and thereby expected utility
of searching for a job in region 1. The expected utility of becoming inactive
in region 1 is not aﬀected. In other words, the expected utility of searching
in the other region (equation 4) decreases in γ, because the probability of
obtaining a job in the other region decreases if more people have already
decided to look for a job in region 2. The expected utility of searching
in their own region (equation 3) increases in γ, because the probability of
obtaining a job in their own region increases if more people have already
decided to drop out of the labour market in region 1. The expected utility
of becoming inactive in region 1 (equation 5) does not depend on γ. The
individuals who make their migration/participation decision one after the
other will choose to search to look for work in the other region until the
14expected utility of searching for a job in the other region equals the expected
utility of becoming inactive in point a. After that the next individuals will
decide to become inactive until the expected utility of becoming inactive
equals the expected utility of searching for a job in their own region in point
b. In sum, a fraction γa of the working age population in region 1 will look
for a job in the other region and a fraction (γb − γa) will become inactive.
Part (II) of ﬁgure 1 represents the situation in which the expected utility of
searching for a job in the other region is much lower than in part (I) of ﬁgure
1 and people do not search in the other region. A fraction γb of the working
age population chooses to become inactive, whereas the rest of the working
age people who did not have a job in the previous period search for a job in
region 1.
Part (III) of ﬁgure 1 represents the situation in which people either search for
a job in their own region, or search for a job in the other region. A fraction γc
of the working age population searches for a job in the other region. People
do not become inactive.
Part (IV) of ﬁgure 1 represents the situation in which all jobless individuals
choose to look for work in their own region.
The locations where the curves representing the expected utility of searching
f o raj o bi nr e g i o n1 , searching for a job in region 2, and becoming inactive
intersect (points a,b, and c with corresponding γa,γb, and γc) determine the
amount of migration and the number of people that become inactive. If
γb > γc > γa > 0w eh a v et h es i t u a t i o ni npart (I) of ﬁgure 1 and there will
be both migration (γa) and nonparticipation (γb −γa). If γb > γc and point
a does not exist (the curves do not intersect) we have the situation in part
(II) of ﬁg u r e1a n daf r a c t i o nγb of the working age population will become
inactive, but no one will migrate. If γa > γc > γb we have the situation in
part (III) of ﬁg u r e1a n daf r a c t i o nγc of the working age population will
15search for a job in the other region and no one will become inactive. If only
the curves representing the expected utility of becoming inactive and the
curve representing expected utility of searching in the other region intersect
(in other words γa > 0 and the both points b and c do not exist) we have the
situation as depicted in part (IV) of ﬁgure 1. All individuals will search for
a job in their own region (region 1). The location of the points a,b, and c
with corresponding γa,γb, and γc can be determined by using equations 1-5.
The possible situations in the inﬂow region (region 2) are similar to the
situations depicted in part (II) and part (IV) of ﬁgure 1. Individuals either
search in their own region, or they become inactive
4 Concluding remarks
In a large part of Continental Europe sectoral wages are set at the national
level. In this paper we have developed a framework to study e.g. the inﬂuence
of demand shocks, changes in bargaining power, and unemployment beneﬁts
on regional labour markets under centralised wage bargaining.
For now we have abstracted from multilevel wage bargaining. Note, however,
that even in countries with predominantly centralised wage bargaining actual
wages may diﬀer across individual ﬁrms and regions within a sector due to
multilevel wage bargaining resulting in the so-called ‘wage drift’ at the local
level. An example of a country with multilevel wage bargaining is Belgium
(OECD, 2004).
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